Evidenx does not score. This card presents bounded facts; significance is for the analyst to assign.
Step 1 of 10Scope & signal reduction
What was collected, and how much of it a machine could confirm
Nothing here came from an alert. This is a reconstruction from evidence collected after the fact, which is the situation an incident response exists for: by the time anyone looks, the processes have exited and whatever was going to fire has already not fired. Evidenx starts from what the hosts recorded anyway.
It moves that evidence up a fixed ladder, Artifact → Observation → Entity. Below is the full first rung: every artifact type parsed, on every host, nothing dropped for turning out not to matter. The last number is how much of it an automated check could confirm on its own.
484,830
Stage 1 artifacts
→
651,387
Stage 2 observations
→
10
confirmed automatically
MFT
329,501
presence only
ACME-APP-04 95,578 · ACME-WS-027 233,923
USN Journal
140,635
presence only
ACME-APP-04 60,610 · ACME-WS-027 80,025
Event Logs
6,839
execution recorded, in part
ACME-APP-04 3,116 · ACME-WS-027 3,723
SRUM
4,989
execution inferred
ACME-APP-04 733 · ACME-WS-027 4,256
Amcache
600
presence only
ACME-APP-04 131 · ACME-WS-027 469
Services
462
referenced, not observed directly
ACME-APP-04 196 · ACME-WS-027 266
Scheduled Tasks
405
presence only
ACME-APP-04 155 · ACME-WS-027 250
Shimcache
352
presence only
ACME-APP-04 120 · ACME-WS-027 232
Prefetch
272
execution inferred
ACME-APP-04 0 · ACME-WS-027 272
Running Processes
234
execution recorded
ACME-APP-04 83 · ACME-WS-027 151
File Listing
210
presence only
ACME-APP-04 135 · ACME-WS-027 75
Netstat
110
referenced, not observed directly
ACME-APP-04 39 · ACME-WS-027 71
Registry
81
execution inferred, in part
ACME-APP-04 26 · ACME-WS-027 55
registry_bam, registry_recentdocs, registry_run_mru, registry_shellbags, registry_startupitems, registry_userassist, registry_users
Browser History
62
presence only
ACME-APP-04 0 · ACME-WS-027 62
chrome_history, edge_history
Installed Programs
61
presence only
ACME-APP-04 29 · ACME-WS-027 32
Jump Lists
12
referenced, not observed directly
ACME-APP-04 4 · ACME-WS-027 8
PowerShell History
3
execution inferred, in part
ACME-APP-04 0 · ACME-WS-027 3
LNK Files
2
presence only
ACME-APP-04 0 · ACME-WS-027 2
25 artifact types across 2 hosts, ordered by size. The small line on each card is what that artifact type's observations actually claim, read from their own assertions rather than from a label: an entry recording that a binary was seen is not a record that it ran. A zero is a collected artifact that held nothing for this host, kept here because it was collected, not dropped because it turned out not to matter.
Collection footprint, disclosed. 468 of the 651,387 observations above (0.07%) record the collection itself rather than activity on the host: filesystem records of the artefact archives being written. By host: ACME-APP-04 333, ACME-WS-027 135. By artifact type: file_listing 92, mft 54, usnjrnl 322. They are counted, not deleted, because Evidenx does not discard silently and this is recognised by naming convention, which can be wrong. Any step below that reports on-host file activity must exclude them or it presents the collector's own work as scenario activity.
None of the matched observations below is in that footprint, so no part of this hypothesis rests on a record of the collection. Checked, not assumed.
Step 2 of 10The hosted session (target)
What the target host recorded about the session it served
Activity consistent with a remote PowerShell session hosted on ACME-APP-04.
the anchor · eventlog.wsmprovhost_creation_target
Everything else on this card is weighed against this one record. Without it Evidenx says nothing at all, which is deliberate: a reconstruction that fires on corroboration alone is a guess. WSMPROVHOST.EXE is spawned per PSRemoting session on the host that serves it, and a 4688 record is the OS recording that creation directly. This is the anchor because it is available on both client and server SKUs, unlike Prefetch. Its absence has two very different causes that this predicate cannot tell apart: nothing ran, or process-creation auditing was off. Confirm the audit policy before reading absence as the former.
eventlog.wsmprovhost_creation_target · 1 matched
2026-10-08T06:43:46Z
wsmprovhost.exeprocess_creation_recorded
eventlog · Security · execution recorded
command line: C:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding
pid: 3412
spawned by: ACME-APP-04$
srum.wsmprovhost_target · 1 matched
2026-10-08T07:09:59Z
wsmprovhost.exefile_execution_supported
srum · execution supported
account: Administrator
account SID: S-1-5-21-947577232-668727590-2141992596-500
SRUM source: application_resource_usage
foreground time: 120.1s (1,201,400,000 x 100ns)
Only records that say the binary RAN appear here. The network logon and the listening socket are two steps on: they show the transport was there and reachable, which is not the same as a session having been served.
Step 3 of 10Source side: who reached in
What the initiating host recorded, and why none of it is automatic
The automated check is deliberately target-only: it establishes that a session was served, and says nothing about who opened it. Everything below is therefore evidence an investigator reads, not a conclusion the tool reached, and it is labelled that way throughout so the two are never confused.
context · not matched by this the automated check
PowerShell logging on ACME-WS-027 whose text contains Invoke-Command, New-PSSession, Enter-PSSession, New-PSDrive. Evidenx cannot search inside command text yet, so none of this could be confirmed automatically. It is here because an investigator needs it. Excerpts are truncated and every path they contain is printed in full underneath, because the point is which host and which file, not what the whole script said.
2026-10-08T06:33:44Z
Invoke-Command 4103 module/pipeline log
CommandInvocation(Get-Content): "Get-Content" ParameterBinding(Get-Content): name="Path"; value="C:\ACMELab\Scenario\Invoke-LabScenario.ps1" CommandInvocation(S…
2026-10-08T06:36:06Z
Invoke-Command 4104 script block
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop' $root='C:\ACMELab\Scenario';$target='10.211.55.6';$share="\\$target\AppDeploy" function Record($Phase,$Detail){ [pscustomobject]@{…
2026-10-08T06:36:10Z
New-PSDrive 4103 module/pipeline log
CommandInvocation(New-PSDrive): "New-PSDrive" ParameterBinding(New-PSDrive): name="Name"; value="ACMEDEPLOY" ParameterBinding(New-PSDrive): name="PSProvider"; v…
2026-10-08T06:40:35Z
Invoke-Command 4104 script block
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop' $root='C:\ACMELab\Scenario';$target='10.211.55.6';$share="\\$target\AppDeploy" function Record($Phase,$Detail){ [pscustomobject]@{…
2026-10-08T06:40:35Z
New-PSDrive 4103 module/pipeline log
CommandInvocation(New-PSDrive): "New-PSDrive" ParameterBinding(New-PSDrive): name="Name"; value="ACMEDEPLOY" ParameterBinding(New-PSDrive): name="PSProvider"; v…
2026-10-08T06:43:48Z
Invoke-Command 4103 module/pipeline log
CommandInvocation(Invoke-Command): "Invoke-Command" ParameterBinding(Invoke-Command): name="Session"; value="[PSSession]WinRM1" ParameterBinding(Invoke-Command)…
2026-10-08T06:43:48Z
New-PSSession 4103 module/pipeline log
CommandInvocation(New-PSSession): "New-PSSession" ParameterBinding(New-PSSession): name="ComputerName"; value="10.211.55.6" ParameterBinding(New-PSSession): nam…
read by an investigator, not confirmed by the check
The file-share audit, for the window above. Event 5145 is the only Windows record that names which file crossed a share, so this is where a package transfer becomes visible at all. The IPC$ named pipes are left out: 825 of this case's 845 share records are lsarpc from ordinary SMB session setup, and a named pipe is not a file crossing a share.
06:36:10Z
ACME-APP-04file shareshare reached: \\*\AppDeploy on \??\C:\ACMELab\Scenario\Deploy by Administrator from 10.211.55.5
06:36:10Z
ACME-APP-04file shareshare access checked: \\*\AppDeploy on ACME-Update-Package.zip by Administrator from 10.211.55.5
06:36:10Z
ACME-APP-04file shareshare access checked: \\*\AppDeploy on ACME-Update-Package.zip by Administrator from 10.211.55.5
06:36:11Z
ACME-APP-04file shareshare access checked: \\*\AppDeploy on ACME-Update-Package.zip by Administrator from 10.211.55.5
06:36:11Z
ACME-APP-04file shareshare access checked: \\*\AppDeploy on ACME-Update-Package.zip by Administrator from 10.211.55.5
06:40:35Z
ACME-APP-04file shareshare access checked: \\*\AppDeploy on ACME-Update-Package.zip by Administrator from 10.211.55.5
06:40:35Z
ACME-APP-04file shareshare access checked: \\*\AppDeploy on ACME-Update-Package.zip by Administrator from 10.211.55.5
read by an investigator, not confirmed by the check
These fields sit inside records that WERE confirmed, and they name the host at the other end. Evidenx cannot resolve an initiator from a logon record, so the pairing is the investigator's to make.
2026-10-08T06:36:10Z
IpAddress = 10.211.55.5via eventlog.network_logon_target
2026-10-08T06:36:10Z
WorkstationName = ACME-WS-027via eventlog.network_logon_target
Step 4 of 10Independent corroboration
What each supporting record adds, and what it cannot carry
None of these could carry the reconstruction on its own, and none was asked to. They widen what an investigator sees around the anchor. Each is listed with what it does and, more usefully, what it cannot establish.
Confirmed, and showing reachability or authentication rather than execution:
eventlog.network_logon_target · 6 matched
2026-10-08T06:36:10Z
Security 4624eventlog_record_recorded
eventlog · Security · execution not_applicable
LogonType: 3
IpAddress: 10.211.55.5
WorkstationName: ACME-WS-027
TargetUserName: Administrator
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
2026-10-08T06:43:46Z
Security 4624eventlog_record_recorded
eventlog · Security · execution not_applicable
LogonType: 3
WorkstationName: ACME-WS-027
TargetUserName: Administrator
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
2026-10-08T06:43:47Z
Security 4624eventlog_record_recorded
eventlog · Security · execution not_applicable
LogonType: 3
WorkstationName: ACME-WS-027
TargetUserName: Administrator
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
2026-10-08T06:43:48Z
Security 4624eventlog_record_recorded
eventlog · Security · execution not_applicable
LogonType: 3
WorkstationName: ACME-WS-027
TargetUserName: Administrator
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
2026-10-08T06:45:46Z
Security 4624eventlog_record_recorded
eventlog · Security · execution not_applicable
LogonType: 3
WorkstationName: ACME-WS-027
TargetUserName: Administrator
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
2026-10-08T06:45:46Z
Security 4624eventlog_record_recorded
eventlog · Security · execution not_applicable
LogonType: 3
WorkstationName: ACME-WS-027
TargetUserName: Administrator
AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
netstat.winrm_listener_target · 2 matched
2026-10-07T19:58:28Z
obs_8bbece5c9dc3789b091e65f1network_connection_observed
netstat · execution unknown
local port: 5985
socket state: LISTEN
2026-10-07T19:58:28Z
obs_2453da9c33fcdfe2b7fc7614network_connection_observed
netstat · execution unknown
local port: 5985
socket state: LISTEN
What each one is for, and its limits, in the words of whoever wrote the check:
prefetch.wsmprovhost_target · not found
Prefetch corroborates the session host's execution on a client SKU. It is NOT expected on a Windows Server target: Server defaults EnablePrefetcher to 0, so application prefetching does not run and no .pf file is ever written. Confirmed on a real Server 2022 target (case_003, ACME-APP-04): the collection succeeded, the glob matched nothing, and the parser was never invoked. Absence on a server is a fact about the host class, never about the session, which is why this is neutral and no longer required.
shimcache.wsmprovhost_target · not found
Shimcache records the binary having been run, independently of Prefetch. Shimcache writes are flushed at shutdown, so a recent session may legitimately not appear.
amcache.wsmprovhost_target · not found
Amcache records the binary's presence and is a third independent source for the same file. It asserts presence, not execution.
srum.wsmprovhost_target · found
SRUM records resource use per application per user over an interval, so a record naming WSMPROVHOST.EXE is execution 'supported' in our vocabulary, the BAM/UserAssist/Prefetch tier, and it carries the account the session ran as. It is the one target-side execution corroborator available on a Windows Server target, where Prefetch is not: confirmed on case_003's ACME-APP-04, which wrote no .pf file at all yet recorded wsmprovhost.exe in Application Resource Usage with 120s of foreground time attributed to the built-in Administrator (RID 500). Absence is neutral for three reasons that this predicate cannot tell apart: which SRUM tables exist varies by SKU (that same host has no Execution Stats table at all), SRUM samples intervals rather than recording every process, and its rows age out. Absence is a fact about what SRUM retained, not about the session.
record_timestamp is the interval record time, not a process start time, and SRUM rows age out. On case_003 the SRUM interval reads 2026-10-08T07:09:59Z while the 4688 for the same process reads 06:43:46; that is the interval granularity, not a second session, and this observable must not be read as a timestamp correlation with the anchor.
eventlog.network_logon_target · found
A PSRemoting session authenticates to the target over the network, which the OS records as a Type 3 logon. A served session with no network logon at all would be unusual.
netstat.winrm_listener_target · found
WinRM listening on 5985 shows the service was reachable at collection time. It is a live snapshot: it says nothing about whether it was listening when a session was served, and it evidences reachability, not a session.
Step 5 of 10Timeline
11 hours 11 minutes, both hosts merged
2026-10-07 to 2026-10-08, 19:58:28Z to 07:09:59Z, both hosts merged by timestamp. 11 hours 11 minutes.
19:58:28Z
ACME-APP-04networklistening on 5985
19:58:28Z
ACME-APP-04networklistening on 5985
06:33:44Z
ACME-WS-027powershellcontext, not matchedOperational 4103: PowerShell module/pipeline execution
06:36:06Z
ACME-WS-027powershellcontext, not matchedscript block: $ErrorActionPreference='Stop' $root='C:\ACMELab\Scenario';$target='10.211.55.6';$share="\\$target\AppDeploy" f…
paths in full: C:\ACMELab\Scenario, 10.211.55.6, \\$target\AppDeploy, Y:\ACME-Update-Package.zip
06:36:10Z
ACME-APP-04authenticationnetwork logon succeeded: Administrator from ACME-WS-027, 10.211.55.5
06:36:10Z
ACME-WS-027powershellcontext, not matchedOperational 4103: PowerShell module/pipeline execution
06:40:35Z
ACME-WS-027powershellcontext, not matchedscript block: $ErrorActionPreference='Stop' $root='C:\ACMELab\Scenario';$target='10.211.55.6';$share="\\$target\AppDeploy" f…
paths in full: C:\ACMELab\Scenario, 10.211.55.6, \\$target\AppDeploy
06:40:35Z
ACME-WS-027powershellcontext, not matchedOperational 4103: PowerShell module/pipeline execution
06:43:46Z
ACME-APP-04executioncreated: C:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding (as ACME-APP-04$)
06:43:46Z
ACME-APP-04authenticationnetwork logon succeeded: Administrator from ACME-WS-027
06:43:47Z
ACME-APP-04authenticationnetwork logon succeeded: Administrator from ACME-WS-027
06:43:48Z
ACME-APP-04authenticationnetwork logon succeeded: Administrator from ACME-WS-027
06:43:48Z
ACME-WS-027powershellcontext, not matchedOperational 4103: PowerShell module/pipeline execution
06:43:48Z
ACME-WS-027powershellcontext, not matchedOperational 4103: PowerShell module/pipeline execution
06:45:46Z
ACME-APP-04authenticationnetwork logon succeeded: Administrator from ACME-WS-027
06:45:46Z
ACME-APP-04authenticationnetwork logon succeeded: Administrator from ACME-WS-027
07:09:59Z
ACME-APP-04executionSRUM intervalwsmprovhost.exe recorded in application resource usage, 120.1s foreground, account Administrator
The first row is a live snapshot: its timestamp is when that socket was opened, not when anything in this hypothesis happened. It stretches the span above and should not be read as the start of the activity.
Step 6 of 10Everything else in that window
What the hosts recorded that nothing was looking for
Between 06:36:10Z and 07:09:59Z, the window the confirmed evidence spans, these hosts recorded 7,533 further things that nothing asked about. No alert covered them and no automated check looked for them. Grouped by where and what, largest first, and deliberately not filtered by relevance: an investigator decides what matters here, which is the whole point of showing it.
Outside the operating system's own directories
586Operational 4103 · PowerShell module/pipeline execution
eventlog record recorded
ACME-APP-04 · 06:36:59Z → 07:08:24Z
507Operational 4103 · PowerShell module/pipeline execution
eventlog record recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 06:36:10Z → 07:09:54Z
400Security 5145 · A network share object was checked for desired access
eventlog record recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 06:42:53Z → 07:07:58Z
249Operational 4104 · PowerShell script block logging
eventlog record recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 06:36:10Z → 07:09:54Z
228Security 5145 · A network share object was checked for desired access
eventlog record recorded
ACME-APP-04 · 06:36:10Z → 07:08:06Z
193srum
file execution supported
ACME-WS-027 · 07:09:00Z
119Operational 4104 · PowerShell script block logging
eventlog record recorded
ACME-APP-04 · 06:36:58Z → 07:08:24Z
79\.\c:\acmelab\scenario\businessdata\79 in 1s
file data change recorded
ACME-APP-04 · 06:45:44Z → 06:45:45Z
60\.\c:\users\bob\appdata\local\microsoft\edge\user data\default\
file change recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 06:51:08Z → 07:07:56Z
60\.\c:\users\bob\appdata\roaming\microsoft\windows\recent\customdestinations\60 in 4s
file change recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 07:03:38Z → 07:03:41Z
57\device\harddiskvolume3\windows\system32\
file execution supported
ACME-WS-027 · 07:09:00Z
55\.\c:\acmelab\scenario\businessdata\55 in 1s
file creation recorded
ACME-APP-04 · 06:45:44Z → 06:45:45Z
183 further group(s) not shown.
Under C:\Windows and friends
Listed second because the OS writes here constantly on its own. Separating them is a statement about location, not about suspicion, and nothing here is ranked.
339\.\c:\windows\systemtemp\
file creation recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 06:42:56Z → 07:09:18Z
275\.\c:\windows\system32\config\systemprofile\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\powershell\
file data change recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 06:42:56Z → 07:08:58Z
226\.\c:\windows\systemtemp\
file data change recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 06:42:56Z → 07:09:18Z
219\.\c:\windows\systemtemp\
file change recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 06:42:56Z → 07:09:18Z
202c:\windows\system32\
process creation recorded
ACME-WS-027 · 06:36:55Z → 07:09:54Z
192\.\c:\windows\temp\
file creation recorded
ACME-APP-04 · 06:36:57Z → 07:08:23Z
169 further group(s) not shown.
An automated check answers the question it was written to ask and no other. Nothing here was hidden or discarded: it sits in the same evidence the confirmed findings came from. It is on the card because a reader shown only the confirmed findings would have no idea what else happened in those thirty-four minutes.
Step 7 of 10Expected but absent
Looked for on purpose, and not found
3 of the 7 things Evidenx looked for were not found. None of them was load-bearing, so the reconstruction stands; what each absence is actually worth is below, and for most of them the answer is nothing.
4 of 7 observables matched1 required, matched6 corroborating, 3 absent
What each absence means, and whether it counts for anything. absent is searched and genuinely not there. not_collected means that evidence was never gathered, which says something about the collection and nothing about the incident.
prefetch.wsmprovhost_target · not_collected · significance neutral
Prefetch corroborates the session host's execution on a client SKU. It is NOT expected on a Windows Server target: Server defaults EnablePrefetcher to 0, so application prefetching does not run and no .pf file is ever written. Confirmed on a real Server 2022 target (case_003, ACME-APP-04): the collection succeeded, the glob matched nothing, and the parser was never invoked. Absence on a server is a fact about the host class, never about the session, which is why this is neutral and no longer required.
shimcache.wsmprovhost_target · absent · significance neutral
Shimcache records the binary having been run, independently of Prefetch. Shimcache writes are flushed at shutdown, so a recent session may legitimately not appear.
amcache.wsmprovhost_target · absent · significance neutral
Amcache records the binary's presence and is a third independent source for the same file. It asserts presence, not execution.
That covers what was deliberately looked for, and nothing more. It is not a claim that nothing else is missing from this case. Steps 3 and 6 sit entirely outside what any automated check here asked about.
Collection coverage for srum on ACME-APP-04 is complete: every source was searched, so an absence of it is a finding rather than a gap.
Collection coverage for srum on ACME-WS-027 is complete: every source was searched, so an absence of it is a finding rather than a gap.
Step 8 of 10What could not be checked automatically
Real evidence that still needs a human to read it
The evidence in Step 3, 7 script blocks and the host-identifying fields inside the matched logon records, is as real as anything else on this card and was read from the same place. It is not counted among the 10 confirmed records and it changed nothing above. The gap is in what can be checked automatically, not in the evidence or in whether it was collected.
Nothing automated looks at the initiating host at all, so Evidenx states that a session was served and never who opened it.
Searching inside command and script text needs substring or regex matching, which Evidenx does not have yet: it compares whole values. So the clearest evidence on the source host cannot be reached automatically at all.
Pairing two hosts from a logon record's <code>IpAddress</code> and <code>WorkstationName</code> field is not built. An investigator reads it in a second; Evidenx will not assert it.
This is the honest edge of the tool. Everything named here was in the evidence, on this card, and visible to a human reading it; what is missing is the ability to reach it without one. That distinction is the reason the card separates confirmed findings from evidence throughout, instead of presenting a single undifferentiated story.
Step 9 of 10Hypothesis
What is claimed, what would argue against it, and what else fits
Activity consistent with a remote PowerShell session hosted on ACME-APP-04.
T1021.006T1059.001
This establishes indicators only; it does not establish maliciousness, attribution, or intent.
10 distinct matches3 artifact types: eventlog, netstat, srum3 absences surfaced
What ran under it
The matched process is pid 3412. These processes were created beneath it, read from the 4688 records themselves: each row is one record stating a pid, its parent and its command line. Nothing here is inferred.
06:43:46Z
pid 3412the matched processC:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding
06:43:52Z
pid 2996child of 3412"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\ACMELab\Scenario\Installed\Invoke-LabImpact.ps1
06:43:52Z
pid 3856child of 2996\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Read from the records, not from a Stage 3 relationship. Stage 3 builds process lineage only from pslist: all 193 of this case's process_is_child_of_process relationships are backed by pslist observations, and its builder reads ppid, which is pslist's field name, while a 4688 carries parent_process_id. pslist is a snapshot taken at collection time, so a process that had already exited cannot appear in it, which is every process in an incident that is over before anyone collects. The chain above is therefore true and unmodelled.
What followed, in the same window
Step 6 in full. These are the tightest groups outside the operating system's own directories, each a burst of filesystem records compressed into seconds:
- 79 file data change recorded in
\.\c:\acmelab\scenario\businessdata\ on ACME-APP-04, 06:45:44Z to 06:45:45Z - 60 file change recorded in
\.\c:\users\bob\appdata\roaming\microsoft\windows\recent\customdestinations\ on ACME-WS-027, 07:03:38Z to 07:03:41Z - 55 file creation recorded in
\.\c:\acmelab\scenario\businessdata\ on ACME-APP-04, 06:45:44Z to 06:45:45Z - 35 file change recorded in
\.\c:\acmelab\scenario\businessdata\ on ACME-APP-04, 06:45:44Z to 06:45:45Z - 20 file creation recorded in
\.\c:\users\bob\appdata\roaming\microsoft\windows\recent\customdestinations\ on ACME-WS-027, 07:03:38Z to 07:03:41Z
Adjacent in time and on the same host as the chain above. Evidenx does not assert that one caused the other: no relationship connects a process to files it created, so that link is the analyst's to make and the evidence for it is the adjacency, not an edge.
Evidence against
None recorded, and that is not the same as none existing. contradicting_observations is empty on every hypothesis this version produces: the evaluator has no mechanism for populating it, so an empty list here means nothing was looked for, not that nothing was found. Read it as a gap in the tool, never as support for the hypothesis.
The nearest thing this card does carry is Step 7: 3 things that were expected and not found. Each is listed there with whether it counts for anything, and none of them is weighed against this reconstruction here.
The competing explanation
The matched evidence establishes that a session was hosted on ACME-APP-04 by Administrator from ACME-WS-027, at the times in Step 5. It does not establish that it was unauthorised. An administrator doing routine remote maintenance produces the same 4688, the same Type 3 logon and the same SRUM row. Nothing in the matched set distinguishes the two, and Evidenx does not classify.
What that explanation now also has to account for is above, and none of it was confirmed automatically: the command line of what ran under the session, and a burst of filesystem writes on the same host two minutes later. Those are facts on this card, not a verdict. Whether they are routine is answered by the same things that were already missing.
What would settle it, none of which is in this case: a change or ticket record covering this window; a baseline showing whether this account routinely reaches this host from this one; and whether the authentication package, account and source pairing matches that routine. Those are questions about context and about what was collected, not about matching, which is why no automated check answers them and why the determination below is a human one.
Evidenx does not score; significance is for the analyst to assign.
Step 10 of 10Conclusion
The analyst's call: Evidenx stops at understanding
Analyst determination
Left intentionally blank. This is the analyst's conclusion to record. Evidenx provides the evidence, not the verdict.